Download PDF Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945 By Andrew Roberts
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Ebook About “Masterly. . . . Roberts’s portrait of the relationship between the four men who made Allied strategy through the war years is a triumph of vivid description, telling anecdotes, and informed analysis." —Max Hastings, The New York Review of BooksAn epic joint biography, Masters and Commanders explores the degree to which the course of the Second World War turned on the relationships and temperaments of four of the strongest personalities of the twentieth century: political masters Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt and the commanders of their armed forces, General Sir Alan Brooke and General George C. Marshall. Each was exceptionally tough-willed and strong-minded, and each was certain that only he knew best how to win the war. Andrew Roberts, "Britain's finest contemporary military historian" (The Economist), traces the mutual suspicion and admiration, the rebuffs and the charm, the often-explosive disagreements and wary reconciliations, and he helps us to appreciate the motives and imperatives of these key leaders as they worked tirelessly in the monumental struggle to destroy Nazism.Book Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945 Review :
The focus of Roberts' work is the complex interrelationship of four key leaders: Roosevelt and Churchill (the "Masters," i.e., the political players) and Brooke and Marshall (the "Commanders," i.e., the military leaders). He presents these four figures (along with a distinguished supporting cast of notable figures) as ultimately responsible for what he calls WW2's "grand strategy." The story that Roberts tells is one of a rather sobering struggle for power between Britain and the US. On Britain's side, the struggle largely comprised attempts to maintain a relatively equal position as American contributions of personnel and materiel began to far outstrip Britain's own contributions. On America's side, the struggle took shape as a fight against an at least perceived (if not actually real) British "craftiness" in pursuing its own political ends.I suppose, at one level, Roberts' book could be considered a jaundiced reading of United States-Great Britain relations during WW2; however, it avoids a cynical tone, maintaining a sense of sympathetic realism. One thing Roberts finely elucidated is the subtle but significant differences in the relations of political and military power in the US and Great Britain which, in many ways, accounted for the differences of each nations' final objectives and methods. My impression is that there was a decidedly greater separation of political and military power within the American system than within the British system, though that may simply be what we could call the "Churchill effect." If anything, Roberts does a terrific job of painting Churchill as the "madcap genius" he was--equal parts brilliant, annoying, suave, and, at the end of day, absolutely inimitable as a national and international figure.For me, however, the best part of Roberts' telling is how he showcases the key sacrifices that George Marshall, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Sir Alan Brooke, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, made for their countries. Every general dreams of leading an army into a field of battle and yet, both Marshall and Brooke were forced to surrender their dream of leading the D-Day invasion because they were more valuable in their administrative roles. The history that Roberts relates, though, convincingly demonstrates that, without them, final victory would never have come to the Allies.Much of what makes Roberts' work so compelling is his access to the "unofficial" (and technically illegal on the British side) diaries of the military and political advisors who orbited around these four. He uses these sources to read "against" the official stories that have been published, most vigorously it seems against Churchill's own later accounting. Fortunately, he does this in a way that doesn't turn the work into a salacious and sensational kind of "World War 2: The Unauthorized Biography"; rather, he remains grounded in the established facts of actual events, which allows the unofficial sources to enrich and enliven the official history rather than simply to overturn it. Where the "official" story is wrong, Roberts' use of diaries and letters often led him to offer very plausible reasons why later retellings diverged from what we now know of the actual course of events. These, as often as not, were rooted in a touching and deeply human concern for the feelings and reputations of other significant leaders.I suppose the only real disappointment I had was the fact that, though Roberts referred several times to a great "falling out" after the conclusion of the war between Churchill and Brooke, he never really took the time to tell that story. The reason is simple: once Roosevelt died, the "Big Four" that were the focus of his narrative were no longer, so the story had to end. I would like to hope that Roberts will one day write about that.It never seems to fail that, no matter how "distant" a book may seem from my own expressed interests or current circumstances, I find within it something that seems to miraculously speak to my current "Sitz im Leben." The story of Marshall's and Brooke's sacrifices of personal glory for the greater good of the war effort was, for reasons that would be too convoluted to explain here, a very important story for me to hear at this particular life juncture. Perhaps it's a stretch to say that God "led" me to read this particular book, but it is no stretch at all for me to say that I'm grateful to God that I DID read it.For those fascinated with the astounding history of World War II or those who find themselves in unexpected and, to be honest, sometimes unwanted positions of leadership and responsibility, this book has many important lessons to teach. Roberts is a fine storyteller and a master of the complex characterization, which serves him well in this story of four of the most significant leaders of the 20th century. Very thoroughly researched and entertainingly written, Andrew Roberts presents a detailed look into how the two Western democracies formulated the grand strategy that guided the prosecution of the war. He does not exclude China and the Soviet Union in his narrative but the majority of the book is devoted to Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, George Marshall and Alan Brooke (the Masters and Commanders) with an emphasis on the two Brits. Roberts is British and his point of view for this book is decidedly British. He makes that very clear in the preface to the book. Of the four principles of his story only Brooke maintained a diary during the war but Roberts’ narrative is informed by the diaries and verbatim notes written by those present during the meetings and conferences they attended. Even though Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, General Eisenhower and War Secretary Stimson maintained diaries the reader will learn much more about the British side of things. Other persons intimately connected with directing the war effort also contribute to the story. I was very excited to get a British point of view as my experience has been primarily with American authors and the American side of things.As with many authors the emphasis is on the war with Germany. Some space is made for issues around keeping China supplied, liberating British Asian colonies, the role the Royal Navy will play in the Pacific after the defeat of Germany and the amount of war effort that will be devoted to the Pacific war, the majority of the book is devoted to American and British cooperation in defeating Germany and the arguments about how best to do that. As the last line of the introduction makes clear: “This then is the story of how the four Masters and Commanders of the Western Allies fought each other over how best to fight Adolf Hitler.”And there was a lot of fighting and arguing. The early years of America’s involvement in the war saw nothing but squabbles, some very heated, over where America’s newly forming army would engage the Wehrmacht. It is well known that in first months of America’s involvement in the war General Marshall insisted on Europe while the British favored N. Africa. It all revolved around the question of how best to engage the German Army so as to provide the most help to the Soviets. The struggle to persuade Marshall to change his mind on invading Europe in 1942 and to convince him that N Africa was the best choice for the US Army’s first engagement with Germany takes up a large part of the opening year of the war and the opening chapters of the book. We all know that Roosevelt was the decider there. Roberts really does a wonderful job investigating and describing the conferences and meetings that decided the strategy for the war with Germany. Using private diaries and notes of War Cabinet meeting that violated strict rules prohibiting such things, Roberts presents a fascinating narrative of how the Masters and Commanders devised the Western Allied strategy that resulted in victory in Europe. I really did enjoy this book, it covers much more than the strategy meetings, conferences, disagreements and the compromises, also covering the creation of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combined Chiefs of Staff and how those bodies functioned. I couldn’t give it less than 5 stars even though I have some gripes with some of the author’s opinions.I was disappointed that Roberts seems to place so much reliance on the work of Trevor Dupuy, his work has been largely discredited. There is a large body of much more recent work that Roberts could have investigated but it is clear that he is using Dupuy to support his personal feelings and biases.I largely agree with Roberts’ assessment of the successes and mistakes of the grand strategy hammered out by the Masters and Commanders with the exception of Operation Dragoon. While it is true that the Germans decided not to contest the landing, began an immediate retreat and Dragoon did not draw German Divisions from Normandy, that does not mean it was a failure or a wasted effort. Yes, the French Riviera is a long way from Paris (as Roberts points out) but the Dragoon forces were not headed to Paris. The Allies needed to get two armies into France to extend the front to the Swiss border and the Channel ports and beaches were crowded with supplies, reinforcements and replacements for the 21st and 12th Army Groups. The 6th Army Group moved into France quickly and they were supplied entirely through Marseille and Toulon. Roberts does touch on the difficulty in moving infantry and armor divisions into Europe then ignores the success of the 6th Army Group in doing just that. He gives a very weak criticism of that operation that I interpreted to mean that he just did not like the operation. He indicates that it took resources from Italian operations after he criticizes the effort made in advancing to Rome. It all seemed very wishy-washy.While Roberts points out certain mistakes in strategy that I largely agree with he completely overlooks Operation Market Garden. That was a disappointment. I would think Winston and Brookie would have had some very interesting comments about the destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division, a waste of manpower the British could not afford. Newly promoted Field Marshal Montgomery’s single thrust to jump the lower Rheine and attack the Ruhr was a massive failure and I have always suspected that is why Eisenhower would no longer entertain any notions of another single thrust into Germany commanded by Monty or anyone else.My last gripe is prompted by this quote from page 297. “In divisional terms, the US Army had 37 trained divisions at the time of Pearl Harbor, 73 by Operation Torch, 120 by the summer of 1943 and 200 by D-Day.” It is well known that the US Army produced only 90 divisions during the entire war and the 2nd Cavalry Division was deactivated after landing in N Africa in May of 1944. So the US had only 89 divisions to fight the war against Germany and Japan. That’s it! No more. And some did not see combat. All the numbers in that quote are wrong. The paragraph that quote comes from contains only one citation that is associated with the number he gives for the divisions of the British Commonwealth. How is it possible for a man who has spent so much time researching and writing about World War II to not have heard of the “90 division gamble?” Where could he have possibly come up with those numbers? 37 trained divisions by Pearl Harbor – 200 by D-Day! It must have been in his notes without a citation and he just went with it. Roberts does list “Command Decisions” edited by Kent Roberts Greenfield in the bibliography so he really has no excuse. This is especially true since he explains that the US was not prepared to engage a large portion of the Wehrmacht in 1942. In chapter 6 he discusses Marshall’s visit to London in April 1942 and on page 144 he quotes Brooke describing what took place during one of the meetings: “Marshall ‘gave us a long talk on his views concerning the desirability of starting [the] western front next September and [stated] that the USA forces would take part. However the total force which they could transport by then only consisted of 2 ½ divisions!! No very great contribution.’” So only 2 ½ divisions ready to engage Germany in September 1942. Not 37 that were supposedly ready by Pearl Harbor and certainly not the 73 he says were ready by Torch (November 1942). Roberts in fact spends quite a bit of time explaining that the US was very unprepared for major combat in 1942 so how in the world could he have written that nonsense about the number of trained divisions available at different points in the war on page 297? I just can’t let it go. I must remind myself that it has nothing to do with the development of strategy, he was trying to make a point about the phenomenal mobilization of US military and industry.I would like to end this long review by saying that I do not think my gripes take away from the overall enjoyment of Roberts’ narrative. Even with that last one that still takes up space in my head he has produced a wonderful book examining how the Allies developed their strategy to deal with Hitler that is both incredibly informative and delightfully entertaining. I do not feel that he was biased against Roosevelt or Marshall. Each of the four gets a fair share of criticism and praise as well as many other Allied generals who come into the story. Some of the minor characters in the story do get more criticism than praise but I agreed with Roberts’ characterizations, or the quotes from some of the diaries about them, for the most part. I particularly enjoyed this one: “…Alexander [General Sir Harold Alexander] taking over as supreme commander in the Mediterranean, ‘a post for which he is totally unfitted’ in Cunningham’s [Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham – ABC] view, because he was ‘completely stupid’” (p. 530)I would enthusiastically recommend this book to anyone interested in Allied grand strategy in World War II. It is a big story that Andrew Roberts is telling and I think that overall he has done a superlative job. 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